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ABSTRACT
The risk of epidemics represents an important challenge in offshore petroleum activities. All
personnel are needed for regular operations, and the outbreak of an epidemic will soon affect
the operations. The economical consequences can be vast. The risk of an epidemic is raised due
to the closeness of living and catering offshore combined with frequent changes of personnel
who travel offshore from many nations. The article is based on the experience gained by the
author during 22 years as a senior medical officer in a Norwegian oil company. Some endemics
and epidemics are described. None of these resulted in the shutdown of production, but they
still represented a major challenge to the company and to the medical staff in particular. The
transfer value from experience offshore to ships is obvious but there are differences. Risk ana-
lysis and quality assurance systems play an important part in the prevention and limitation of
epidemics offshore. The infrastructure of the food supply chain as well as education and trai-
ning of personnel are key elements. Campaigns on different hygiene topics that address all
personnel are launched at regular intervals. Contingency plans must be established and be
ready for use in case of a threatening epidemic. Identification of the type and source of the
infection or food poisoning, isolation of the infected personnel, safe evacuation of patients, and
the establishment of other necessary barriers for reduction of spread of infection are necessary
to control an outbreak of an epidemic.
(Int Marit Health 2011; 62, 4: 262–265)
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INTRODUCTION
This article is based on the experience gained by
the author during 22 years as a senior medical offic-
er in a Norwegian oil company.
The number of installations rose from zero to more
than 20 during this period. The number of person-
nel on board varied among the installations from
around 20 up to 300. Most of them were large with
a crew of more than 150. The number of personnel
varied according to time of year, because mainte-
nance and major modifications took place during the
summer season, and also varied depending on ac-
tivities like drilling operations and oil-well interven-
tions. All transport was by helicopter from Norway
and the personnel were multinational and multicul-
tural. The majority were Norwegian.
OFFSHORE VERSUS SEAFARING
The offshore personnel work for 2 weeks 12 hours
a day followed by 3 or 4 weeks leave. This implies
a high risk of bringing infections offshore. Ship crews
are generally smaller, stay on board for longer per-
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iods, and shore leave is restricted in time and there-
fore they can be considered a more isolated com-
munity. Both in seafaring and offshore the crew are
multinational, and therefore the patterns of infections
will vary more than in a land based community.
According to Norwegian regulations every offshore
petroleum installation has a doctor who is responsible
for health care and hygiene relating to food, catering,
and epidemics. On board a ship the master has the
similar responsibility, despite limited training in this field.
Offshore there are generally high standards of hy-
giene, accommodation, medical facilities and equipment.
The corresponding standards on ships vary and the
medical facilities and equipment are limited. On every
offshore installation there are one or two registered
nurses, and onshore there is a doctor on 24/7 duty.
On a ship the first mate is responsible for medical acti-
vities, and when necessary he seeks advice via tele-
medical assistance services. The offshore nurses have
education and training in hygiene and take part in spe-
cial courses in food and drinking water hygiene. Nor-
wegian navigational officers on ships are only offered
1–2 hours on these topics during their education.
The offshore medical services have, together with
the catering staff, developed special regimens and
contingency plans to handle and to limit the spread
of epidemics. On board a ship the presence of such
regimens and contingency plans are exceptional.
Many professional cooks and members of the ca-
tering staff offshore have been shown to lack suffi-
cient knowledge, understanding and to have attitudes
to hygiene and safe practices that did not assure the
optimal hygienic standard. It was realised that the
knowledge from their education had faded and fol-
low up education and training had to be established.
The corresponding standards in seafaring vary widely
between high hygienic standards on cruise ships and
substandard approaches on some small coasters.
Patients can easily be evacuated from offshore to
hospitals onshore, and personnel can be sent offshore
for medical assistance or replacement of sick person-
nel within 1.5–3 hours depending on weather condi-
tions and distance. A ship will most often have to rely
on its own scarce resources, and evacuation and re-
placement of crew may be impossible within 2–5 days.
ENDEMICS AND EPIDEMICS EXPERIENCED
OFFSHORE
Seasonal influenza occurs two or more times
a year. This can be explained by multinational per-
sonnel bringing their seasonal influenza offshore.
An influenza epidemic offshore seems to behave sim-
ilarly to one onshore despite the crew living and wor-
king closely together and does not represent a ma-
jor challenge.
Noroviru s causes a few epidemics each year,
normally only 10 to 15 persons are affected. This
may be due to efficient isolation regimens and the
rapid launch of hygienic contingency procedures [1].
Shigella from green salad from Spain caused an
epidemic affecting more than 70 persons. This epi-
demic caused major operational consequences and
the drilling operations were stopped. The patients
could not be transported onshore due to excessive
and urgent diarrhoea.
Hepatitis A was brought offshore by an employee
not working in the catering department and a total
of 9 persons were infected. One patient became se-
riously ill. The offshore installation was isolated for
many days and the media attention represented
a challenge to the operators. Effective contingency
plans came into action based on close collaboration
with the health authorities [2].
Impetigo affected 10 persons in one drilling de-
partment. This kind of epidemic infection in unusual
among adults. The outer ear was affected in all pa-
tients. The source of infection was shown to be
a telephone headset. This endemic presented chal-
lenges in relation to disinfection of telephones, head-
sets, hearing protection devices, and survival suits
and how to regulate helicopter transportation for pa-
tients suffering from infections.
Highly active sputum positive tuberculosis of
the lung was diagnosed in a patient who had been
working 2 periods of 14 days each on many offshore
installations while being contagious. More than 3000
offshore workers underwent chest X-rays and were
tested by Pirquet/Mantoux. There were no second-
ary infections found [3].
METHODS FOR PREVENTING EPIDEMICS
OFFSHORE AND ON SHIPS
RISK ASSESSMENT
Risk assessment is a key element in all matters
related to health, safety and environment, and their
findings provide the best basis for proactive deci-
sions and actions.
Risk assessment should be performed at regular
intervals. The length of the interval should be as-
sessed as part of the risk assessment and the other
parts of the quality assurance system [4].
In the context of epidemics, the risk assessment
should include the following:
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The infectious agents: the different relevant
agents should be identified while taking into account
the multinational supply of crew, food, and water. What
is the source of the different agents? Do they spread
via droplets, direct skin contact, faecal/oral, body flu-
ids, vectors, water, or contaminated food? What is
the replication rate under different conditions, the
incubation period, the possible production of toxins
and the severity of the resulting sickness including
long-term consequences?
The human factors: the human factor is very
important in relation to the initiation and spread of
epidemics and food poisoning. The level of relevant
knowledge among those in the chain of food supply
must be assessed and maintained at the level ne-
cessary for safe practice. Even the use of profession-
al cooks does not assure the necessary quality nee-
ded for the safe supply, storage, production, and han-
dling of food. The attitude and behaviour of personnel
in relation to personal hygiene, professional hygiene,
and their role in the spread of epidemics represent a
major risk factor.
The organisational factors: the company poli-
cy and continuing awareness regarding hygiene and
epidemics must be assessed. Are the quality assu-
rance systems adequate and functioning? These
should include standards and procedures for com-
petence, hygiene, monitoring, reporting of non-com-
pliance, internal audits, GAP-analyses, corrective
measures, and verification.
The infrastructure factors: the standard of fa-
cilities for storage, production, serving, and treatment
of food, drinking water, and leftovers of food must
be assessed. This includes freezer, refrigerator and
counter surfaces and temperature, water storage
tanks, disinfection and control of drinking water, the
facilities for the separation of different food supplies
and products, the availability of cutlery to avoid con-
tamination, and barriers to avoid trespassers ente-
ring the chain of food supply. The availability and
feasibility of personal equipment feasible to avoid con-
tamination from employees is also important. The stan-
dard and availability of cabins, toilets, showers, laun-
dry, towels, soap and the routines and procedures
for cleaning must also be assessed.
The human costs: the consequence of an infec-
tion can vary from minor discomfort to serious sick-
ness resulting in long-term sick leave with or without
chronic sequelae, reduction of quality of life, or even
to death. It is very important to include these conse-
quences in the risk assessment. Another important
aspect is the individual costs resulting is the possi-
ble suspicion, assumption, or confirmation that one
or more individuals are responsible for the epidemic
because of lack of procedures or infrastructure, im-
proper production or handling of food, or being the
source of the infectious agent. There are examples
of individuals committing suicide in such situations.
The economical costs and operational con-
sequences: epidemics can affect key-personnel and
result in major operational consequences, delays, and
even deviation of a ship. A ship can be denied ac-
cess to a harbour because of infections/epidemics
on board. This may result in major costs and loss of
revenue. Necessary healthcare, isolation, tracing of
source, and measures needed for normalisation will
significantly add to the costs.
The safety consequences: epidemics may hit
vital personnel positions and can lead to a non-func-
tioning installation/ship where safety and seaworthi-
ness faces a threat [5].
The stakeholders: epidemics can cause delay
of cargo delivery that in turn may lead to economical
consequences for the customer. The next of kin may
also be affected and the social security for the sea-
farer and his family may suffer seriously if the em-
ployee is disabled for long periods of time, is perma-
nently disabled, or dies. The company will suffer from
economical losses that may affect its stock market
valuation. Relations with clients, investors, employ-
ees, governmental bodies, community, media, and
others can be affected.
The reputation and prequalification: serious
epidemics with operational consequences will cause
news headlines and influence the companies health
and safety statistics, and this may damage the repu-
tation and affect their ability to prequalify for new
contracts or renew existing ones.
QUALITY ASSURANCE
Hygienic acceptance criteria: detailed and
measurable criteria must be defined. Qualified per-
sonnel must be included in this process.
Inspections and audits: internal inspections and
audits must be performed at regular intervals. The length
of the intervals should be assessed as part of the risk
assessment and the quality assurance system. Qualified
personnel must be included in these processes.
GAP-analysis: the possible GAP between the cri-
teria and the present state should be worked out
and serve as a basis for further actions.
Conclusions, decisions, and actions: the GAP-
-analysis will define necessary actions to be taken, but
the decisions are left to be taken by the management.
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Verification: every action has to be surveyed and
the desired effect must be verified.
PREVENTIVE MEASURES
Infrastructure: according to risk assessment and
acceptance criteria.
Standards and procedures: according to risk
assessment and acceptance criteria.
Education and courses: the basic education and
training on food and catering hygiene for cooks and
catering staff is not sufficient to ensure the necessary
knowledge, understanding, and attitude for safe prac-
tice. It is necessary to arrange courses and training at
regular intervals to obtain the desired level of hygiene.
Campaigns: campaigns to increase the awareness
and practice of personal hygiene and how to avoid the
transfer of infective material to others are necessary.
METHODS FOR HANDLING
EPIDEMICS OFFSHORE
When an epidemic is developing or becomes es-
tablished additional precautions have to be taken in
order to limit the spread and reduce its consequenc-
es. It is of great importance that these actions have
been planned in advance and documented in con-
tingency plans [6]. The plans have to be detailed and
must include necessary procedures and informative
material. The plans must be exercised and evalua-
ted regularly. The required equipment and supplies
must be in place at all times. Arrangements that give
access to medical personnel for treatment and care
and continuous evaluation of the situation and of
the actions to be taken must be in place. Important
elements in the contingency planning are as follows:
Identification of the type and source of the
infection or food poisoning: the identification re-
quires assistance from qualified personnel, and oc-
casionally official disease control agencies must be
consulted or involved.
Isolation of the infected personnel: single oc-
cupancy cabins with private toilets should be avai-
lable. If not available, special cleaning procedures
should be instituted. Food and drinks should be
brought to the cabin by protected personnel. Spe-
cial procedures should be established to take care
of waste and other possible contagious material.
Medical evacuation of patients: measures
should be instituted to protect personnel and equi-
pment involved in the evacuation.
Establishing of barriers: intensified personal
hygiene regimens should be instituted such as focu-
sing on hand washing. Reduction of the spread of pos-
sible infectious material between persons by frequent
disinfection of sanitary facilities, use of disposable plas-
tic cutlery, and food offered in individual proportions
or food served by catering staff instead of self service.
No use of re-usable cutlery should be allowed.
Plans for treatment of patients and reactive
prophylactic treatment or vaccination of ex-
posed contacts: such plans must be part of the
contingency plans and must include the supply of
necessary substances [7].
Information and media handling: procedures
for contact with and information to official bodies
and strategies and procedures for informing and
handling media must be established.
DISCUSSION
Epidemics represent a major challenge both in off-
shore petroleum activities and on board ships. The ope-
rational, economic, and personal consequences can
be dramatic. The permanent loss of health, a shut down
of oil production, or the isolation of a cruise ship are
examples of worst case scenarios [8]. It is very impor-
tant to assure the quality of prophylactic measures in
the daily handling of food and water supplies and hy-
giene and to establish a contingency plan to launch in
case of a threatening or an established epidemic. If
not, the treat of a serious epidemic is high and the
handling will have to be based on improvisation.
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